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PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE
CINEMATOGRAPHIC IMAGE:
AN HEGELIAN PERSPECTIVE
Jean-Philippe Deranty
W hat is the matter of cinematographic images? What is thespecific materiality of those complex projections of light onto
screens that we call motion pictures? And consequently, what is the
matter with cinematographic images?
This paper is a phenomenological meditation on the ontology of
cinematographic pictures, taking its inspiration from Hegel's lectures
on aesthetics.! The justification for this anachronistic use of Hegel is
hopefully provided by the analysis as a whole. In his aesthetics, Hegel
studies the modes in which ideas and ideals are expressed differently
in the different art forms. Since these expressions are expressions of
relevant ideas and ideals, Hegel also studies why they matter to
societies and social beings. Few theories deal more extensively with
the matter of, and with, art. It seems to me that the fundamental
theses at the core of his aesthetics can be extended with great fecundity
to the question of cinema.
Part I gives a brief overview of the framework of Hegel's
aesthetics. This framework helps clarify the different meanings of
the "matter" of art. By asking how cinema would fit in this frame-
work, we gain a useful perspective to analyse the specific materiality
of cinema by contrast with other media.
Part I I focuses on the first evident material dimension of
cinematographic images, their being made of light. Hegel's idea of a
historical progress of art as a process of spiritualisation applies also
to the different uses of light. It can be said that for him art history is
also the history of the "spiritualisation" of light, from the most
material, spatial type of light in symbolic art (architecture), to the
inner differentiation of light in the colours of painting. Cinema, as an
art of light, seems to represent the culmination of the arts of visibility.
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For Hegel, spiritualisation of the matter of art leads ultimately to
poetry, where light is no longer material but, metaphorically, the light
of spirit; where the matter of the artwork is the whole realm of
human representations. This narrative inspires the speculative
thought expounded in Part II I: that cinema could in fact be
conceived beyond simple mimesis as the externalisation and projection
of human representations, as the visualisation of the imaginary.
Finally, Part IV deals with another obvious material aspect of
cinematographic images, namely the fact that they reproduce move-
ment by moving themselves. Once more, a central tenet of Hegelian
aesthetics can be put to use to give an account of this dimension. For
Hegel, the capture of movement is another fundamental aspect
underpinning art history in its progress. Again, the question can be
raised from another perspective: despite being an art of visibility,
doesn't cinema, as the art of movement, fulfil one of the essential
representational functions that Hegel assigns to art in general?
I. The matter ofartworks
I will refer mainly to the 1823 Berlin lectures published in Germany
in 1998, because they offer more authentic formulations than the
reference 1845 Hotho edition translated by Knox. 2
As stated in the introduction, in his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel
attempts to answer the following questions: what is the matter of,
and what is the matter with, works of art? He answers these questions
at three different levels, even though these three levels are delineated
along the form-content dichotomy. These three levels can be
characterised as the symbolic order, the order of representation and the
material order.
The first sense of matter in the expression "artistic matter" is the
symbolic matter that provides the cultural framework and the cultural
objects for the artwork. For Hegel, this matter is spiritual, it is Spirit
itself in the guise of sensible representation.) By Spirit, Hegel under-
stands 'the highest representations of a people', the system of values,
core beliefs and norms that underpins that people's existence. In his
lectures on aesthetics, Hegel sometimes understands Spirit as
meaning literally the highest entity in a people's belief system, in
other words this people's deity or deities, but sometimes he means,
more prosaically, the interests and values that are truly important for
human beings and particular societies:
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in general, Art has the aim of making visible what is in
the human Spirit, what is true in the human Spirit, what
stirs the human soul to its roots, what takes place in the
human Spirit .... Art teaches humans about the human,
wakes slumbering emotions about, and gives representa-
tions of, the true interest of Spirit.J
For Hegel, the signified, the spiritual content of art, is Spirit, which
can mean the god or gods of a people, but also, more simply, their
highest values, or even more prosaically their highest interests.
The aim of art is to give the spiritual realm a sensible representation,
that is to say a representation for the senses in sensible matter. The
material order is therefore constituted by the use representation
makes of the two dimensions of space and time, which are defined as
the "general forms of the sensible, that through which all that is sensible
is sensible, the general abstraction of the sensible".5 Architecture uses
brute matter, abstract space and light; sculpture uses formed matter;
painting uses colour and design; music uses sound; and literature uses
words. Hegel sometimes takes the term "content" to identify this
particular aspect of the artwork, sometimes he refers to it as "form",
mostly, however, as "material" (Materia/).
Finally, the representational matter of the work of art is the myth,
the muthos, the actual artistic representation, narration in the case of
literature, the motif in painting, the character in sculpture. Hegel
refers to this side as the "form" of the artwork.
Truth in art is defined as correspondence between content and
form. A spiritual, or symbolic, content requires the corresponding
type of forms, which are best expressed in a particular art form,
which in turn uses a certain material. The three orders are inter-
connected and the different grades of this interconnection define the
system of the art forms (symbolic, classical and romantic) and of the
arts (architecture, painting, music, poetry).
Symbolic art corresponds to a spiritual content that is "more or less
abstract, dim and not yet truly determined in itself'l6, natural, pan-
theistic deities, the "religion of light".? The "form", the representa-
tional object that corresponds to this dim content, is the "form that
is still external, indifferent, the natural, immediate one".8 Since the
symbolic content remains ill defined, no form can adequately express
it. Symbolic art is therefore the realm of the sublime. It is best
captured in architecture, for instance in the sublime shapes of the
pyramids, or "giants, colossi, statues with a hundred arms and a
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hundred breasts".9 The corresponding material is abstract space, the
most abstract form of the abstraction of the sensible.
Classical art is the interconnection of a "true content, the
concrete spiritual", with the true form "which is the human form;
since only this form is the form of the spiritual, the way the spiritual
can form itself in temporal existence". In this (human) shape, Nature
and Spirit, the divine and the human are united. lo The best rep-
resentation of this correspondence is in sculpture. The material is a
new use of space, "the whole space determined in organic figuration
originating inside and spreading into the outside (von Innen heraus)".11
Finally, romantic art's content is the spiritual order developed to the
stage of "the freedom of Spirit", "absolute interiority", "subjectivity
that knows itself as infinite".12 Again, as in classical art, the human
form is here predominant, but this time the human form is inhabited
by the infinity of Spirit and is therefore beyond sensible representation.
The sensible, like in the symbolic form, is unable to capture
adequately the level that Spirit has reached, but this time because
Spirit has moved beyond the natural. The natural and the sensible are
unable to symbolise the content of the artwork. The three romantic
arts are painting, which uses an even more spiritualised form of space,
the surfacej music where space goes to the point, the point in time
(Zeitpunkt)jll and poetry that uses the material of "time, equally the
point, but such that it does not exhibit itselfas formal negativity, but as
perfectly concrete, as point of Spirit, as the thinking subject uniting in
himself the infinite space of representation with the time of sound".'4
II. The material ofrepresentation
For Hegel, there are two ways of writing the historical development
of artistic materials. I shall analyse one in the last section. The first is
the one I have just highlighted. The history of art is the history of
the gradual spiritualisation of the materials used in different art
forms, from the heavy, angular masses in architecture and their
expansion in the three dimensions of space, to the vanishing, near-
inexistent sound of words evoking the whole space of the imaginary in
literature. As art progresses in history, its material loses the resistance
of materiality and becomes more capable of being formed. Artistic
matter becomes what Spirit itself is, form forming itself.
What then is the material of cinema? What stuff is the motion
picture made of? What are the specific temporal and spatial features
of the materiality of the cinematic picture?
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At first, reasoning in Hegelian terms, cinema seems to operate at a
stage of materiality less advanced than literature. Cinema is made up
of moving pictures. It is the same material as the one used in
painting, surface and colour, with the addition of movement.
In point of fact, however, the cinematographic image is made up
of light. The cinematic picture is projected light, whose potentially
infinite expansion is arrested by a screen, a flat, two-dimensional
space.
But there are different sorts of lights. Painting itself, but also
architecture and sculpture, make use of light, but these different uses
must be carefully distinguished. In his Philosophy of Nature, Hegel
defines light as the primary degree of physicality, because light, as
immediate self-identity, points to the primordial indivisibility of
matter: "the first qualified matter exists as pure identity with itself,
unity of reflection in itself, therefore the first still abstract manifestation
.... This existing universal self of matter is light". And further on:
"as the abstract self of matter, light is absolutely lightweight, and as
matter, infinite, but as material ideality it is inseparable and simple
being outside of itself".lj Despite being the first degree of physicality,
that is to say, in Hegel's system, the first degree in the non-spiritual
sphere, light is, however, also an adequate physical figuration, or
metaphor, of Spirit itself since Spirit is also defined as self-identity.
Light corresponds in the natural (the non-spiritual) to what Spirit
becomes in its own sphere: "pure identity with itself".
Hegel distinguishes between the different uses of light in the
different arts, depending on the degree to which this art is able to
reveal the essence of light, namely its spirit-like nature. The history
of art is also the history of the liberation of light from matter, the
history of the spiritualisation of light, until light reaches the point
where it fully reveals its essence as figuration of Spirit. This liberation
of light is liberation from space: .
True, the material of architecture and sculpture is like-
wise visible and coloured, but it is not, as in painting, the
making visible as such; it is not the simple light which,
differentiating itself in its contrast with darkness, and in
combination therewith, becomes colour. This quality of
visibility, inherently subjectivised and posited as ideal,
needs neither the abstract mechanical difference of mass
operative in heavy matter, as in architecture, nor the
totality of sensuous spatiality, which sculpture retains,
even if concentrated and in organic shapes. On the
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contrary, the visibility and the making visible which
belong to painting have their differences in a more ideal
way, i.e. in the particular colour, and they free art from
the complete sensuous spatiality of material things by being
restricted to the dimensions of aplane surface. 16
From architecture to painting, we move from material light to spiritual
light. Material light is used in the symbolic form ofart and corresponds
to the lesser stages of spiritual development. It corresponds, for
instance, to early Eastern religions. 17 Spiritual light is the material of
romantic art and an image of Spirit revealed in its true form. IS Light
is both the material and the object of the romantic artwork.
What kind of light is the cinema image made of? If painting's
medium is "Visibility as such", which means light differentiating itself
into itself, not needing spatiality to produce its differences (viz.
colour), then cinema, as the art of light, can be characterised as the
culmination of the arts of visibility.
If we recall, in the mid-1890s, when engineers throughout the
Western world were engaged in a race to find the right formula that
would make the existing motion picture devices technically and
commercially viable, the Lumiere brothers' cinematographe (patented
13 February 1895) was only one of the possible solutions, alongside
Charles Jenkins' and Thomas Armat's Phantoscope (patented 28 May
1895), the 'lightviewer'.
Mimicking Hegel's phrase, we could say that the cinematographic
image is made up of pure self-differentiating light that does not even
need space, since it can be projected onto any screen and still remain
what it is. Cinematic light is light (almost) liberated from space. Its
relation to space is only contingent. The cinematographic image is
essentially holographic, or ghostly. Thus it is a superior form of
visibility compared to painting and even photography, since they
both require a specific spatial support to which they are attached.
It is striking to note that this short characterisation of the cinemato-
graphic image as expanding in infinity corresponds to what Hegel
thinks is the very essence of light: "absolute expansion in space ...
infinite spatial dispersion (Zerstreuung)".19
To this substantive thesis, a few supplementary remarks can be
added:
I. This characterisation ofcinematographic light could speculatively
explain the eerie beauty of black and white films (as well as black and
white photography), a beauty that often cannot be matched by the
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naturalism of colour films. This is a kind of aesthetic fact that
demands explanation. It arrested many of the great heroes of cinema
theory in the 1930S. Foremost amongst them was Rudolph Arnheim.
For him, black and white, silent photography, was superior to
coloured "talkies" because it does not deter the spectator from the
"essence" of the cinematic medium. Being closer to its artistic
essence, it is closer to art than naturalistic retlexes.2U
It is a fact, for example, that colour, like sound, was a technical
possibility long before it was universally exploited by the industry.
The first fictional director, Georges Melies, introduced colour
through hand-painting and tinting. Hand-painting of the negatives
W3S still commonly used until the early 1930S. By 1906, the Kinema-
color system of Charles Urban and Albert Smith was already a
technical and commercial success. In 1922, the first Technicolor film
was shot Croll ofthe Sea). Cecil B. DeMille's '923 version of The Ten
Commandments had a few scenes in colour using the Technicolor
technique. It is as though for generations of cinema audiences, the
naturalism of colour impinged upon the aesthetic power of moving
pictures.
2. There are many films in which the treatment of light is one of
the main stylistic and thematic issues. One illustrious historical
example is provided by the systematic use of black and white contrasts
in classical Hollywood productions to structure individual frames,
scenes and the narrative itself. Casablanca is a particularly representa-
tive case. Most frames are composed using a sharp opposition of
black and white. For example, throughout the film, Bogart wears a
white jacket and black trousers and moves in a set also sharply
contrasted between heavy black and white elements. In the final
scene, Bergman's and Bogart's fates are symbolically enmeshed in a
smooth scaling of greys that blends into the median shared grey of
their lips and bodies, while the darkness of their heads (Bogart's hat,
Bergman's hat and hair) contrasts with the whiteness of their hearts
(their shirts).
The scenes of smoking rooms could also be mentioned. Smoke is
an object of choice for cinematographers since it arrests light, makes
it appear, as the developer, the revelateur, does in the treatment of
the negative. Smoke is the revealer of light, but so are veils, filters,
windows, broken mirrors, the surface of lakes and oceans, and so on.
One striking example is the aesthetic universe of Max Ophuls. In his
films, obstacles, shutters, curtains, veils, staircases, systematically
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interfere with light. These interferences are not just metaphors but
real instruments, and even protagonists, of the narrative.
J. Many of the great cinematographers have produced images
that have endured because of the poignancy of their light effects.
Interestingly in this Hegelian context, the most famous proponents
of stark light contrasts, the German expressionists, combined their
highly formalistic use of light with their research into the architec-
tural aspect of cinema. One could argue that the light of the German
expressionists corresponds to the architectural use of light that
Hegel defined.
4. Every art form develops into an abstract stage, where reflexion
on its own stylistic, representational and material possibilities and
limits constitutes its main content. Abstract painting ends up in pure
colour and in geometry. Abstract cinema (as in Fernand Leger's Ballet
mecanique) would be about the movements of light, its possible
sources, its diffractions, reflections, and the infinite shadings of
chiaroscuro.
The need for art in human beings stems from Spirit's drive to
make itself objective, to achieve self-reflection: '~rt shares its highest
vocation with religion and philosophy; like the other two it is a way
to express and bring to consciousness the highest demands of
Spirit".21 Art's specificity compared to other spiritual domains is that
its self-representation is in the realm of the sensuous. Art's material
is "spiritualised sensible as well as sensibilised spiritual (vergeistigtes
Sinnliches sowie versinnlichtes Geistiges)".22 The other name of this
element is Schein, semblance, appearance, apparition: "the pure
sensible is Schein and in more accurate form, the shape (Gestalt), it is
the pure appearing {Aussehen) and sounding (Klingen) of things"; '~rt
is beauty's realm of shadows. These sensible shadows are the works
of art".23
This characterisation, which characterises art in general, is suited
more particularly for cinema. Cinema is the art of Schein par excellence,
the art of semblance, where objects and persons are reduced to their
ghostly envelopes. In these metaphors, Hegel links once more the
essence of art to the visible, and more precisely to light effects, to
shadows. Art is simply what makes Spirit visible. Since Spirit tends
towards its own representation, and its material representation is
visible, Hegel might have said of the arts of the visible that they, as
opposed to poetry, were the most adequate figurations of Spirit.
Cinema would then mark the end ofSpirit's quest for its own visibility.
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In strict Hegelian terms, however, the materiality of light, as
opposed to the ideality of time, puts the non-figurative higher. For
Hegel, a crucial step in spiritualisation is accomplished when art
moves from visibility, always tied to spatiality, to temporality, in
which space is reduced to its absolute simplicity as point. Spiritualised
space becomes time as instant, Zeit-punkt, the point in time. Cinema,
despite the fact that it is light in movement, temporal light, remains
bound to the materiality of light, to the externality of visibility.
Therefore, cinema, as the ultimate art of the visible, would have to
be pronounced less "spiritual" than poetry in a Hegelian system of
the arts. In poetry space is present, but only as internal space, as the
space of inner life.
This last remark, however, indicates a new direction, in which the
hierarchy between literature and cinema can be questioned again..
III. The space ofrepresentation
As Hegel explains, poetry marks a progress in the system of the arts
because "the content of the discursive art form, the determinate
formation that is placed in the subjective element {= sound}, is the
representation", because
representation itself is the element, the way in which the
substantial content becomes for itself. It is the thing itself,
the content, that must become the object of Spirit. It
hecomes that in consciousness as represented. The latter
is here material, just as marble, or colour, or sound were.24
In other words, poetry marks a progress in art history, indeed poetry
is the epitome of art, to the extent that all arts are forms of poetry,
because it uses as material a stuff that is already fully spiritual,
namely the whole realm of human representations: "the content of
the discursive art is the whole wealth of the representation".2~Words,
the sounds carrying meaning, are near-immaterial signs whose single
purpose is to evoke the infinite richness of representations. This
superiority of poetry entails also its artistic weakness:
This stuff also has a default, which is that it is not as
determinate as sensible intuition. Representation is of
spiritual nature, and as such, it inherits the generality that
belongs to thought. Consequently, representation cannot
represent the thing concretely as one, as does sculpture. 21t
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By the power of representation, Hegel understands the power
to create a series of mental images that capture the universality of
the thing conceived, ~ithout all the moments that are organically
connected being conceived in their systematic interrelations.
Representation is therefore "picture-thinking", the extraction and
putting-next-to-each-other of the different moments of a notion.
The severing of the systematic links between those moments is what
Hegel calls abstraction. Picture-thinking is opposed to the conceptual
thinking that respects the links between the moments of a notion.
The way picture-thinking operates is fundamentally akin to lit-
erature, as it establishes linear narratives. Famously, the emblematic
mode of representational thinking occurs in religious representation
where:
[representation} gives a separate being to the clements of
its content ... making them presuppositions towards each
other, and phenomena which succeed each other; it
makes their relationship a series of events according to
finite reflective determinations. 27
Representational thinking works by telling a narrative linking the
moments of thought in linear, successive, often causal, fashion.
Conversely, literature is the art of representation. It is on the basis of
this homology that Hegel claims that the material of literature is
made up of the whole wealth of human representations, those mean-
ingful images present within the human soul, the products of the
rational, non-eonceptual powers of the human soul.
This inspires the following speculation: if representation is the
real material of poetry, cannot the same be said of cinema?
The cinematographic picture oscillates between two ontological
dimensions: on the one hand, it is the simple recording of reality, the
recording of the actors acting, of the set, of the light on the set, and
so on. But it is also a fictionalisation of that reality. Even the most
naturalistic form of recording fictionalises its object by framing it,
choosing a point of view, lighting in a certain way, and so on. The
cinematographic image is never simple mimesis. I would like to
propose that the ontological supplement that it brings can be
described in the same terms as poetical images, as representation. In
that sense, what cinema offers is not a simple re-presentation of
reality, but already our intellectual processing of it. Cinema, in that
sense, is the projection outside of internal imagery. It is the imag-
inary made visible.
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This can be substantiated by the fact that, for Hegel, the rep-
resentational faculties of the human mind are directly involved in the
creation of inner images, of an imaginary: "Spirit as human intelligence
is reproductive power to create images (reproduktive Einbil-
dungskraft)".2R This is the lower stage of imagination, the power to
evoke inner images that were created in contact with the external
world. This power becomes active, productive creative power as
Phantasie, the power to create images autonomously as arrangements
of the picture-like material drawn from the wealth of the unconscious
imaginary. But these two types of image-creations function represen-
tationally by extracting aspects of the world, which both capture
them and separate them from each other. A mental image for Hegel
is an aspect of the world made autonomous and internalised. Those
mental images, it could be argued, are exactly what is exposed on
screens in the shape of cinematographic pictures.
This, however, is precisely what constitutes the very material of
art in general: "the (specific] productivity (in art] is the inseparability
of the spiritual and the sensible. We call this type of production,
production of the imagination (Produzieren der Phantasie)".29 Phantasie,
based on the Greek radical pho-, phant-, is obviously dependent on
visibility. Phantasie makes inner intuitions visible, as it is "the spirit,
the rational, the producing spiritual, that brings its own production
into the sensible realm".30 Cinema, as the ultimate art of the visible,
is the most adequate expression of Phantasie. In cinema, the funda-
mental homology between the picture-creating, story-telling powers
of the human mind, representation and imagination, and the means
and ends of art, finds its most appropriate manifestation.
This characterisation of the cinematographic picture as external-
isation of mental images accounts for its uncanny powers, for which
pure mimesis is insufficient. The cinematic image is not, or not just,
an image of the real. It is also an image of our inner world. Of course,
this distinction is ultimately irrelevant for Hegel.
This is the source of cinema's quasi-hypnotic effect. It explains
the lack of effort that is required to view a cinematic sequence
compared to the intellectual strain of reading a page, or the active
contemplation of a painting. The cinematographic picture finds
direct access to our souls because it is the direct exposing of their
content. This famous passage from the 1805 lena lectures describing
the first stage in the mind's creation of inner images, applies well to
the cinematographic world:
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The Human being is this night, this empty nothingness
that contains everything in its simpleness, the richness of
an infinity of representations and pictures. This is the
night, the interior of nature, which exists here-pure Self.
In phantasmagoric representations, it is night all around;
a bloody head suddenly shoots out here, another white
shape there, which disappear in the same way. This is the
night we look into when we look the human being in the
eyes-into a night which is horrible; here one is faced
with the night of the world. 31
In the dark room, the ray of cinematographic light makes this night
visible. Cinema is the representation of our representations, the
imaging of our own images, the staging of the inner world of images,
the telling of immanent stories. Human dreams, nightmares, desires,
phantasms, fears, ideas, ideals, all the pictorial, story-like thoughts of
the human soul become exposed on the screen. This connects to the
ghost-like character of the cinematic picture. The ghostly materiality
of the cinematic picture is adequate for the phantasms and phantas-
magorias of the human soul.
An important dimension of the cinematic picture linked to this is
its intractable generalising aspect. Unlike painting, cinema is unable
to give a sense of the singularity, of the haecceity or thisness, of
objects. Objects in cinema always appear as types. The individual
object serves only to signal a function, a particular usefulness, or
bears some narrative, metaphoric or symbolic connotation.32 It can
never be exhibited in its individual, specific essence, except in rare
cases where an object is granted a particular significance within the
narrative, like Rosebud in Citizen Cane. Even then, though, the sled's
particularity is its name, not its material features. The material
features of Rosebud are such that they merely indicate a sled, not
this sled.
The same is true of characters. A person in a cinematic image is
never this particular person, with her specific physical and psychological
traits. The person immediately indicates a social position, the
character of a genre, a psychological type, and so on. Even the hero's
particular features often depend on general cultural assumptions
about the ideal individual, or particular psychological types. The
typifying nature of cinema, unable to reveal the uniqueness of objects
and individuals, can be related to the general ising tendency of the
picture-creating, connectively-operating activities of the human
mind, the imagination and the understanding.
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Literature's content is indeed the whole realm of human rep-
resentation. But in it representation is immanent, evoked by the
word-signs, still in imaginary form. Cinema makes this representation
explicit, visible, "for itself". And this is precisely the mission of art,
to re-present Spirit, to "present what is the highest in sensuous
form".JJ
IV. Movement
Of course, the most important feature of the cinematographic image
is the fact that it appears to be moving. In one sense, it is obvious
that cinema provides the end of the long quest to represent nature
and human nature, a quest that could not end until movement was
captured. 34 In Hegelian terms, this is the idea that Spirit (humanity)
is destined in essence to give its own representation of itself to itsel(
But Hegel's notations can also account for the particular aesthetics
of movement in more precise terms.
When discussing the essence of beauty in art, Hegel starts by
discussing the beautiful in general and equates it with life. Formally,
artistic beauty is defined like natural beauty, as that which gives the
intuition of the presence of Spirit within nature.
A crucial feature in Hegel's study of the manifestation of life in
natural beings is the emphasis placed on movement. Life is defined
firstly as "ideality". This points to the fact that the different organs
and limbs necessary for the conservation and reproduction of a living
organism must indeed exist separately, but as dependent on the
whole body. They are only relatively real. They are governed by what
Hegel calls the "negative unity" of the whole body.35 Hegel asks the
following question: "How do we recognise the ideality of differences
which appear to exist?" By saying "appear to exist", Hegel simply
points to ideality: the limbs seem to exist by themselves, but in fact
they owe their existence to the entire body. The verb translated by
"appear" is again scheinen. As we know, this is what art is about: art's
function is to produce the Scheinen of Spirit. Consequently true art,
as the mastery of the Schein, can also be conceptualised as the
adequate manifestation of the ideality of living organisms.
The natural manifestation of ideality is movement, purposive
movement in the case of higher organisms. This is because ideality,
the continual negation/vindication of limbs and organs, is a continual
process:
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autonomous movement is the continual liberation from
place, from the sensible being-one. The sensible one is
thus constantly reduced to appearance. In so far as the
one heing has one spatial being-a shape-, it moves in its
limbs, and the more these limbs change, the more it is
lively. This is the way the ideal (das ldeelle) reduces its
concrete material existence to appearance (Schein).J6
In this passage, Hegel goes on to discuss music and dance as two
forms of art that are able to reproduce movement as the expression
of the soul, the life-principle in the organism.
This points to the second way of writing art history, as progress
towards spiritualisation of the sensible: "progress in art is that move-
ment given to the figures".37 This provides a new way of analysing the
aesthetic powers of cinema.
Cinema, the power to create the illusion of movement, is obviously
the most appropriate form of capturing purposeful movement, the
manifestation of souls within bodies. This explains in a new way the
immediate attraction noted earlier, why we are immediately drawn to
the spectacle of other human beings in action. One may recall one of
the first cameras invented was called the praxinoscope, the viewer/
recorder of action.
To make this possible new explanation more vivid, let us consider
for one moment the phenomenological differences between the
literary description ofa person performing an everyday action, or the
description of objects or vehicles moving into space, and the same
scenes depicted in cinema. We would only become interested in the
literary depictions if we could sense that they were narratively or
symbolically relevant, or if the author demonstrated exceptional
stylistic skills in rendering them. In this latter case, these skills would
become the very object of the description. On the other hand, the
simple live recording of a person's actions, even the simple move-
ment of a machine, the flight of a plane, the running of a train, draw
our attention and keep us captivated. We are able to watch for a very
long time even the most trivial series of actions without any narrative
coherence, for the sheer pleasure of following autonomous move-
ment. Movement needs no substantive aim since it is its own telos.
This is what Hegel refers to as locomotion in his analysis of the
ideality of life as manifested in movement. Locomotion is "self-
movement" (Selbst-bewegung): both a transitive, and intransitive,
immanent process, since making oneself move is both moving
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towards something else and, by actualising one's power to do so,
making oneself move towards and within oneself.
The culmination of Spirit in nature is reached in the individuality
of the human being because in it, ideality takes its supreme shape in
the form of teleological movement. This implies two features of
artistic beauty that apply particularly well to cinema.
First, as a consequence of locomotion as self-movement, for
Hegel, the human body is more beautiful than any other body. This
points to the fact that cinema is extremely reluctant to depict any-
thing but human actions. We can become enthralled by the painting
of apples on a table but the same depiction in a film would be far less
powerful if it did not take place in a narrative involving the actions of
persons.
Moreover, "the second side of singularity is that in order to be, it
excludes [other things], is thus implicated with the outside world,
dependent on external goals of which it serves as a means, or that it
uses the external as means."~8 This is the side of the "prose of life"39,
the many sides that tie the purposeful movements of human singularity
to outside elements. We are moving into the sphere of the thematic
content of art. It is worth noting that the thematic, representational
order, emerges out of considerations on the material aspect of move-
ment. The whole prose of life is immediately of interest to us
because it is the environment in which the self-determining process
of Spirit, symbolised by actions and purposeful movements,
manifests itself. Again, this goes a long way towards explaining the
immediate attraction we feel for the most realistic, or conversely the
most incredible, plots in visual media, whose banality and triviality
would be totally unacceptable in works of literature, of which we
demand wit and originality.
To conclude, I shall just mention two new questions that will
signal the direction of further meditation on the aesthetic powers of
cinema inspired by Hegel's aesthetics.
I. What are the defining features of an age, such that cinema was
to be its most adequate form of representation? In other words, what
is the link, in a Hegelian or post-Hegelian framework, between
philosophy of history and art history, after the "end of history" and
"end of art"? Other ways of asking the same question would be: is
cinema a new form of romantic art or is there such a thing as a post-
romantic art? Or more simply: who are the gods depicted in our
films? This paper has attempted to give some elements towards
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answering the question of how they are depicted.
2. How and why is it that Hegel's analyses of the identity, status
and roles of heroes, and on the normative features of narratives,
reflect so accurately so many of the heroes and narratives that can be
seen in cinema, and especially in contemporary commercial cinema?
What could scriptwriters learn from Hegel's aesthetics?
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